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Abstract
The lack of large realistic datasets presents
a bottleneck in online deception detec-
tion studies. In this paper, we apply a
data collection method based on social
network analysis to quickly identify high-
quality deceptive and truthful online re-
views1 from Amazon. The dataset con-
tains more than 10,000 deceptive reviews
and is diverse in product domains and re-
viewers. Using this dataset, we explore
effective general features for online de-
ception detection that perform well across
domains. We demonstrate that with gen-
eralized features – advertising speak and
writing complexity scores – deception de-
tection performance can be further im-
proved by adding additional deceptive re-
views from assorted domains in training.
Finally, reviewer level evaluation gives an
interesting insight into different deceptive
reviewers’ writing styles.
1 Introduction
Online reviews are increasingly being used by
consumers in making purchase decisions. A re-
cent survey by the Nielsen Company shows that
57% of electronic shoppers and 45% of car shop-
pers were influenced by online reviews. However,
due to the widespread growth of crowdsourcing
platforms like Mechanical Turk, large-scale or-
ganized campaigns can be quickly launched and
create massive malicious reviews in order to pro-
mote products or to defame competitors. Decep-
tive product reviews can easily bias and mislead
consumers’ perception of product quality.
Deceptive opinion spam detection is challeng-
ing because deception makers can target various
1Dataset will also be released
objects and domains (e.g., commercial products
or services) and the language is dynamic to adapt
to distinct objects. Basically, the goal of decep-
tion detection is to recognize varied and general-
ized linguistic cues that can indicate deceit across
domains, which is dramatically different from se-
mantic analysis (e.g. sentiment analysis). So far,
understanding of deceptive language in general is
still scarce. One major obstacle is that it is diffi-
cult to obtain ground truth deceptive and authen-
tic reviews. Ott et al. (2011) revealed that it is
impossible for humans to accurately identify and
label deception. Therefore, a common method
to have ground truth labels for deception detec-
tion (Li et al., 2014) is to ask customers or domain
experts to write down deceptive reviews following
a carefully designed and strictly controlled pro-
cedure. Such a data collection approach is slow,
costly and hard to scale. Consequently, most of
the prior research has used small datasets contain-
ing several hundred of reviews that usually take
weeks to collect (Ott et al., 2011). Moreover, this
data collection method is too strict and cannot re-
flect real world online review manipulation pro-
cesses.
Due to the difficulty of deception data collec-
tion, most research has been limited to study de-
ception within an individual domain such as ho-
tel or restaurant (Ott et al., 2011; Feng et al.,
2012; Ott et al., 2013; Li et al., 2014). Con-
sequently, only several conceptual types of fea-
tures have been studied for deception detection
including genre indicative Part-Of-Speech (POS)
features and psychologically motivated Linguis-
tic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker
et al., 2015) category features. What is surpris-
ing is that among all the studied features, Bag-Of-
Word (BOW) features remain the most effective
type of features for deception detection. Until very
recently, Li et al. (2014) suggested that POS fea-
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tures and LIWC features are better than BOW fea-
tures in generalizing across domains, solely based
on their experiments with several hundred reviews
and three domains. Without large scale realistic
data, it is difficult to gain a deeper understanding
of general rules for online deception detection.
In this paper, we apply an existing online decep-
tion data collection method (Fayazi et al., 2015)
that recognizes online campaigns of malicious re-
view posting and further employ social network
analysis on reviewer-reviewer graphs, which can
quickly accumulate the list of deceptive reviewers
as well as deceptive reviews. The deceptive re-
views collected in this manner are rich in terms
of authors and domains. We constructed a dataset
containing around 10,000 deceptive reviews writ-
ten by 1,540 deceptive reviewers, ranging over
more than 30 domains including books, electron-
ics, movies, etc. Using such an author and domain
diversified dataset, we are able to conduct exten-
sive cross-domain experiments in order to search
for general rules on deception detection. Then we
demonstrate that with generalized sets of features,
increasing amounts of data from arbitrarily differ-
ent domains can continuously improve the perfor-
mance of deception detection, which also shows
the value of this scalable deception data collection
method. In addition, our preliminary experiments
on reviewer level deception analysis shows that
detection systems trained with data from review-
ers of a type might perform poorly in detecting
opinion spam written by reviewers of a contrast-
ing type.
This paper has two major contributions. First,
we connect two communities – social media anal-
ysis and language analysis – that have worked on
online deception detection but with a different fo-
cus. We apply an existing social network anal-
ysis based algorithm for collecting a large and
rich dataset from the wild online world. Sec-
ond, we are the first to conduct linguistically moti-
vated deception detection analysis using such a di-
verse dataset that is two orders of magnitude larger
than the datasets used in previous studies. Most
prior studies are based on manually collected un-
real and small datasets, and the lack of large and
real datasets significantly limits the depth of de-
ception detection research. Our experiments show
that general rules for deception detection are likely
to be revealed by large-scale cross-domain exper-
iments in modeling writing styles instead of mod-
eling contents as in single-domain experiments.
2 Related Work
Previous studies mainly relied on four types of
methods to obtain deceptive reviews. The first
method is to ask human annotators to label decep-
tive reviews (Jindal et al., 2010; Mukherjee et al.,
2012). However, studies show that humans are
not good at identifying deceptive reviews and the
annotation performance is poor (Ott et al., 2011).
Therefore, Ott et al. (2011, 2013) introduced the
second approach that they asked Amazon Mechan-
ical Turkers to compose 400 deceptive and 400
non-deceptive reviews. Similarly, Li et al. (2014)
asked both Mechanical Turkers and domain ex-
perts to write deceptive reviews. There are two
main drawbacks of this method. First, it is too
strict to scale. Second, this strict method does not
reflect how deceptive reviews are posted in the real
online environment.
The third approach used rule-based heuristics to
filter reviews which are likely to be deceptive (Jin-
dal and Liu, 2007, 2008; Hammad, 2013). The
rules include labeling reviews that contain cer-
tain keywords as deceptive, labeling duplicate or
near duplicate reviews as deceptive, labeling prod-
uct irrelevant reviews as deceptive, etc. Nonethe-
less, such methods can be easily fooled by care-
ful deceptive review creators. Lastly, the fourth
method (Mukherjee et al., 2013) proposed a de-
ceptive review dataset by simply collecting re-
views filtered by the Yelp website as ground truth
deceptive reviews and collecting reviews not fil-
tered as authentic reviews. However, the filtering
mechanism used by Yelp is still a black box and
unknown. Therefore, the data collected by such
method is not trustworthy.
So far, due to the lack of a large and realis-
tic dataset, language analysis research for online
deception detection are restricted. Jindal and Liu
(2008) first studied the problem of deceptive opin-
ion spam. They discussed the evolution of opin-
ion mining, which focused on summarizing the
opinions from text in order to identify duplicate
opinions as spam. Ott et al. (2011) presented
three different types of basic features for deceptive
spam detection including n-grams, POS tags and
LIWC. Feng et al. (2012) found that syntactic sty-
lometry features derived from Context Free Gram-
mar (CFG) parse trees improved deception detec-
tion performance over several baselines that use
shallow lexico-syntactic features. Li et al. (2014)
found that LIWC and POS are more robust than
n-grams features when applied to cross-domain
adaptation. More recently, a multi-task learning
method (Hai et al., 2016) for deception detection
is developed to exploit domain relatedness and to
use unlabeled data.
3 Dataset Construction
Crowdsourcing platforms have been shown their
effectiveness in organizing large amounts of in-
dividuals to work on a target task. These plat-
forms also provide an alternative strategy to re-
quest deceptive reviews in order to promote their
own products. Recently, Fayazi et al. (2015) in-
troduced an approach to understand massive ma-
nipulation of online reviews. For our purpose, we
employed their approach to collect real world ma-
nipulation of online reviews.
Briefly, this deceptive review collection ap-
proach has two steps. First, we identified decep-
tive review request tasks from crowdsourcing plat-
forms. Tracking the Amazon URL in each task
which links to a specific product, we collected re-
views associated with the product as well as re-
viewers’ information. We next augmented this
base set of reviews, reviewers and products via
a three hop breadth-first search, and applied so-
cial network analysis techniques to a rich product-
reviewer-review graph in order to identify addi-
tional deceptive review composers and their writ-
ten deceptive reviews (Figure 1). Details are given
in section 3.1 and section 3.2.
Figure 1: Online Deceptive Review Collection us-
ing Social Network Analysis
3.1 Initial Products, Reviewers and Reviews
First, we followed the framework presented by
(Fayazi et al., 2015) and crawled deceptive review
creation tasks posted on ShortTask.com, Rapid-
Workers.com, and Microworkers.com. Starting
from this as root task set, we collect initial de-
ceptive products, reviews and reviewers. Then we
crawled three hops to identify a larger candidate
set of potential deceptive reviews, reviewers and
products.
3.2 Discovering Additional Deceptive
Reviewers
In order to identify additional deceptive review-
ers who have contributed deceptive reviews, we
applied a reviewer-reviewer graph clustering al-
gorithm using a pairwise Markov Random Field
(MRF) that defines individual and pair poten-
tials (Fayazi et al., 2015). Specifically, every node
in the random field corresponds to one reviewer.
Individual level potential (single reviewer) and
pairwise potential (between two reviewers) func-
tions are used to capture two intuitions. (i) Two re-
viewers who collaborated (responded to the same
task) heavily should be assigned to the same clus-
ter. (ii) Two reviewers who behave similarly in
posting reviews probably belong to the same clus-
ter (deceptive or authentic). For instance, one re-
viewer who actually purchased a product and an-
other reviewer who did not purchase the product
should be put to different clusters.
Then, we formalized the goal of identifying ad-
ditional deception making reviewers using a maxi-
mizing the likelihood function, which is optimized
using an Expectation Maximization (EM) algo-
rithm. EM iterates over two steps to increase
the overall likelihood. In specific, E-Step finds
the best cluster assignments given current parame-
ters and M-Step updates parameters given the best
cluster assignment.
3.3 Ground Truth
The aforementioned social network analysis ap-
proach also identifies various deceptive reviewers
and deceptive products. To get ground truth la-
bels of reviews, deceptive or authentic, we applied
multiple sieves on reviews, based on their review-
ers and targeted products. Specifically, we deem a
review as deceptive if it satisfies the following two
conditions: (i) Its author is marked as a deceptive
reviewer; and (ii) The product this review com-
mented on appears in an initial deceptive review
request task. Meanwhile, we deem a review as au-
thentic if neither its reviewer nor its commented
product has been labeled as deceptive by the data
collection system 2.
2All deceptive and authentic reviews were collected from
3-hop breadth-first search over the social network graph, as
described in Section 3.1.
This method of collecting deceptive reviews
and authentic reviews is reasonable. First, Fayazi
et al. (2015) reported that their social analysis
model can achieve high performance - 0.96 AUC
(Area Under the ROC Curve) on balanced training
and test sets and 0.77 AUC on unbalanced sets3.
Second, our double filtering (reviewer-level and
product-level) further controls the quality in label-
ing deceptive and authentic reviews.
4 Dataset Overview
The dataset we collected contains more than
10,000 deceptive reviews, which is significantly
larger than the datasets examined in previous stud-
ies. In addition, the dataset is from the real world
manipulation and is diverse in reviewers and prod-
ucts (Table 1 shows dataset statistics).
deceptive truthful
reviews 10114 101226
reviewers 1540 16497
products 994 72266
Table 1: Number of Reviews, Reviewers and Prod-
ucts
The deceptive products that were targeted in
crowdsourcing websites can be organized into 32
domains based on the product hierarchy on Ama-
zon. Therefore, it is impossible to train a de-
ception detection system for each domain, which
motivates our research on deriving general rules
for deception detection that can apply across do-
mains. We further see that the domains are highly
unbalanced in size, for instance, 4,555 decep-
tive reviews were identified for “Kindle Edition”
books while only 38 deceptive reviews were iden-
tified for “Kitchen” related products, which re-
flects skewed distribution of deceptive reviews in
reality to certain degree. In contrast, the datasets
used in prior studies are small and roughly bal-
anced.
5 General Linguistic Features
We first discuss linguistic features that have been
used in previous studies (section 5.1). Then we in-
troduce our new types of features in order to model
3In their evaluation, the unbalanced training and test sets
each contains half of the original data, so real world deceptive
to authentic ratio can be kept. Balanced sets undersample au-
thentic reviews so that each set has equal number of deceptive
and authentic reviews.
advertising language that is commonly used in de-
ceptive reviews (section 5.2) and syntactic com-
plexities (section 5.3).
5.1 Basic Features
N-gram Based Lexical Features: Both unigrams
and bigrams (Brown et al., 1992) features have
been used for deception detection (Ott et al.,
2011). To be consistent with the cross-domain ex-
perimental settings in Li et al. (2014), we only
consider unigram lexical features (BOWs) in our
experiment.
LIWC Features: Features derived using the Lin-
guistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) lexi-
con (Pennebaker et al., 2015) has been shown ef-
fective in both within-domain (Ott et al., 2011;
Shojaee et al., 2013; Ott et al., 2013) and cross-
domain (Li et al., 2014) deceptive opinion spam
detection. We use features derived from the LIWC
2015 lexicon, which consists of 125 psychologi-
cally interesting semantic classes.
POS Features: It has been observed that the dis-
tribution of words’ POS tags in a document is in-
dicative of its genre or certain writing style. Part-
Of-Speech features (Biber et al., 1999; Rayson
et al., 2001) have been shown useful for deception
detection.
Syntactic Production Rule Features: Feng et al.
(2012) introduced syntactic production rule fea-
tures for deception detection that are drawn from
Context Free Grammar (CFG) syntactic parse
trees of sentences. We used the Stanford coreNLP
tool4 to obtain both POS tags and CFG production
rules for product reviews. In addition, we realized
that the bottom level syntactic production rules
have the form of POS tag → WORD and include
lexical words, which are dependent on specific do-
mains and their vocabularies overlap with BOWs
features. Therefore, we experiment with the ex-
tracted syntactic production rule features with or
without the bottom level rules in order to under-
stand their generalities in deception detection, and
distinguish them as All Production (AP) rules and
Unlexicalized Production (UP) rules.
5.2 Features Modeling Advertising Language
Commonly Used Advertising Phrases: The pur-
pose of deceptive review writing is to promote a
certain product or to directly persuade customers
4http://stanfordnlp.github.io/CoreNLP/
to buy the product.5 Therefore, we hypothesize
that deceptive reviews are likely to adopt mar-
keting phrases more frequently than truthful re-
views. Specifically, we crawled lists of advertis-
ing phrases from online blogs6 and websites7 that
provide suggestions for writing persuasive prod-
uct advertisements. The advertising phrases in-
clude efficient phrases to persuade people to make
purchase, including cause-and-effect phrases (e.g.,
due to, thus, accordingly), premium adjectives
(e.g., exclusive, guaranteed, unique), premium
verbs (e.g., try it, discover, love) and phrases
that inspire safety (e.g., authentic, certificated, pri-
vacy), etc. Finally, all advertising phrases are used
as a set of binary features (presence vs. absence). 8
Ngrams in Product Description Titles: We ob-
served that many faked reviews repeatedly men-
tion entire or partial product name. For some
specific models or products, they even mention
five or more successive words same as in their
descriptions. Reasonably, deceptive review com-
posers have not purchased and used the products,
so they more frequently refer back to the product
descriptions in order to imagine relevant reviews.
In contrast, truthful customers write reviews de-
scribing their real experience using the products
and rely less on product descriptions. In specific,
we count the number of common features shared
by a review and corresponding product description
in terms of unigram and bigram and put two fre-
quency scores as new features.
5.3 Syntactic Complexity Features Indicating
Deceptive Writing Styles
Syntactic complexity scores (Lu, 2010) have been
shown useful in measuring text readability and
distinguishing authorships. These scores have not
been used in deception detection. But intuitively,
deceptive reviewers do not want to invest too much
time to get paid so they unconsciously tend to use
simple sentence syntactic structure to write.9 Fol-
5Interestingly, we observed that almost all tasks we
crawled from crowdsourcing websites are promoting specific
products which might reflect real-life manipulation behavior
that promoting is the majority.
6https://blog.bufferapp.com/words-and-
phrases-that-convert-ultimate-list
7http://systemagicmotives.com/Effecti
ve%20Ad%20Words.htm
8299 advertising phrases are used in total
9In our dataset, average sentence length is 17.8 for decep-
tive reviews versus 20.9 for authentic reviews. Average num-
ber of clauses per sentence 1.97 for deceptive reviews versus
2.28 for authentic reviews.
lowing (Lu, 2010), we use a range of measure-
ment scores to represent sentence syntactic com-
plexity, including sentence length, clause length,
average number of clauses or specific syntactic
constructions per sentence, etc. Specifically, we
use the Tregex (Levy and Andrew, 2006) system
to query syntactic parse trees10 using predefined
Tregex patterns.
6 Experimental Results
6.1 Data and Settings
As shown in Table 2, we merge similar product
categories and create four broad product domains.
All the remaining product domains were put under
the catch-all “Other” category, which is a mixture
of a variety of product domains. Table 3 shows the
number of deceptive reviews in each category.
Large domains Contain categories
Books
Hardcover
Paperback
Kindle Edition
Health/Beauty Health and BeautyHealth and Personal Care
Electronics
Electronics
Personal Computers
Cell Phones
Movies Movies and TVDVD
Table 2: Four Broad Product Domains
Books Health Electronics Movies Other
6244 2118 228 292 1232
Table 3: Number of Reviews for Each Domain
In the experiments, we use Maximum En-
tropy (Berger et al., 1996) classifiers11. Specifi-
cally, we use the implementation of Maxent mod-
els in the LIBLINEAR library (Fan et al., 2008)
with default parameter settings. In reality, there
are generally many more authentic reviews than
deceptive ones. In order to reflect the actual
skewed label distribution, we randomly selected
truthful reviews three times of deceptive reviews
across our experiments. In contrast, the previous
studies on deception detection often artificially en-
force deceptive and truthful reviews to be bal-
anced.
10http://nlp.stanford.edu/software
/tregex.shtml
11We also tried Support Vector Machines and achieved
similar results.
6.2 In-domain Evaluation
First, we restrict the experiments within one do-
main where both the training and test data are from
one domain. Specifically, we conduct in-domain
experiments for each of the four broad product do-
mains using 5-fold cross validation. We experi-
ment with each of the basic features as described
in subsection 5.1, with one type of features each
time.
Features Macro Average
unigram 80.2/88.0/83.9
POS (Biber et al., 1999) 32.9/56.7/41.6
LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2015) 46.0/63.4/53.3
AP (Feng et al., 2012) 76.0/86.0/80.7
UP (Feng et al., 2012) 56.6/62.6/59.5
Table 4: In-domain Experimental Results Using
Different Features, Recall/Precision/F1-score
Table 4 shows the macro average scores across
four domains when using each type of features.
Consistent with the previous studies (Ott et al.,
2012, 2013; Li et al., 2014), the best in-domain
performance is achieved using unigrams. In addi-
tion, the second best performed type of features is
AP features that include the bottom-level syntac-
tic production rules with lexical words. The three
other types of features, POS, LIWC and UP fea-
tures, perform significantly worse on in-domain
deception detection.
6.3 Cross-domain Evaluation
To test whether deception detection classifiers im-
plementing general rules perform well across dis-
tinct domains, we conduct extensive cross-domain
experiments. Specifically, with a set of features we
train a classifier using reviews from each of four
domains – Books, Health, Electronics, Movies –
and test the classifier on the rest three domains.
In each of the four runs, we train a classifier
using one domain and report the macro-average
recall/precision/F1-score of the classifier across
the rest three test domains with respect to decep-
tive reviews detection. To measure how the set
of features performs overall for deception detec-
tion, we further calculate the meta macro-average
scores over the four sets of macro-average scores
resulted from each run.
Table 5 shows the macro-average scores from
each run trained with one domain as well as the
meta macro-average scores across the four sepa-
rate runs. From the first section of Table 5, we can
see that in cross-domain experiments with each of
the five basic types of features, the classifier using
UP features outperforms the classifier using Un-
igrams or AP features overall. Especially in the
runs trained with three smaller domains, Health,
Electronics, Movies, UP features are promising
in deriving generalized deception detection clas-
sifiers. Next, we add each of the first three types
of basic features on top of UP features. It turns
out that POS features slightly improve the over-
all performance, while both Unigrams and LIWC
features hurt the overall performance.
Table 5 (With New Features section) shows the
cross-domain experimental results when we in-
creasingly add two new types of linguistic fea-
tures. We can see that the features modeling ad-
vertising language can clearly improve the per-
formance of deception detection across the four
classifiers trained on each domain, showing that
advertising language is commonly seen across
four domains. Furthermore, adding the syntactic
complexity features can slightly improve both the
macro-average recall and precision in deception
detection.
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTMs) (Hochre-
iter and Schmidhuber, 1997) and Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs) (LeCun et al., 1998)
have been shown effective on deriving composi-
tional meanings of texts and have achieved great
success across many NLP tasks (Sutskever et al.,
2014; Zaremba et al., 2014; Kim, 2014). For com-
parison purposes, we also conduct cross-domain
experiments using both LSTMs and CNNs trained
on top of word2vec 300 dimensions word embed-
dings (Mikolov et al., 2013). 12 From the sec-
ond section of Table 5, we can see that the per-
formance of both neural net models are worse
than our feature-based classifiers using well se-
lected generalized features. One explanation for
the lower performance of neural nets on deception
detection is that this task is not about understand-
ing semantic meanings of reviews, rather, decep-
tion detection is about understanding and recog-
nizing subtle syntactic or stylistic clues and foot-
prints of deceptive writing. Our strong claim is
that general rules for deception detection cannot
12For LSTMs, we use one hidden-layer of 128 hidden
units. For CNNs, we use filter window size 3, 4 and 5, and
a hidden-layer of 100 hidden units. For both LSTMs and
CNNs, we run Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001,
dropout rate of 0.5.
Features Books Health Electronics Movies Macro Average
Unigrams 53/73/61 19/73/31 24/67/35 22/79/34 29.3/72.9/41.8
POS (Biber et al., 1999) 36/48/41 16/52/24 22/48/30 28/47/35 25.5/48.7/33.4
LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2015) 35/53/42 13/51/21 34/46/39 23/50/31 26.0/50.1/34.2
AP (Feng et al., 2012) 56/71/63 20/74/31 27/62/38 24/72/36 31.7/69.8/43.6
UP (Feng et al., 2012) 48/55/51 32/55/40 38/48/43 43/48/45 40.2/51.5/45.1
UP + POS 48/55/52 32/56/41 39/50/44 41/48/44 40.0/52.3/45.3
Results from Neural Net Models
LSTM (Zaremba et al., 2014) 45/67/54 31/65/42 39/57/47 34/66/45 37.5/63.7/47.2
CNN (Kim, 2014) 45/57/50 31/58/40 30/52/38 41/60/48 36.7/57.1/44.7
With New Features
UP + POS + ad 50/60/55 33/63/44 42/54/47 43/55/48 42.0/58.0/48.8
UP + POS + ad + comp 51/61/56 32/64/43 42/54/47 44/55/49 42.3/58.5/49.1
Table 5: Cross-domain Experimental Results Using Different Features, Recall/Precision/F1-score
Features Books Health Electronics Movies Macro Average
UP + POS 41/62/49 40/58/48 49/53/51 47/55/50 44.3/56.9/49.8
With New Features
UP + POS + ad 45/71/55 45/66/54 63/58/60 59/60/59 52.9/63.6/57.8
UP + POS + ad + comp 45/73/56 44/67/53 62/60/61 59/62/60 52.4/65.4/58.2
Table 6: Cross-domain Experimental Results after Adding Training Data from Other Domains
be obtained continuing single-domain studies (in
which simple unigram is the best) and we have
shown that cross-domain experiments are promis-
ing in revealing general rules.
6.3.1 Adding Training Data from Distinct
Domains
We have seen that classifiers trained with gener-
alized features perform well across the rest three
domains. So far, all the classifiers we have used
in cross-domain evaluation were trained with data
from a single domain. However, we hypothesize
that generalized features should enable deception
detection classifiers to further benefit from addi-
tional training data, even when the data is from
dramatically different domains.
Therefore, we augment each single domain set
of reviews with additional reviews from “Other”
domains (assorted domains) which contain 1,232
deceptive reviews (Table 3), and rerun the cross-
domain experiments. From Table 6, we can see
that using the best set of basic features, UP+POS,
the detection performance of classifiers were sig-
nificantly improved after including additional re-
views from assorted domains in training. The
improvements are 6-7% across domains except
Books, where adding 1,232 more deceptive re-
views to 6,244 deceptive instances on Books may
0 1x 2x 3x 4x 5x 6x
Times more deceptive reviews from assorted domains
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Figure 2: Learning Curves
not notably change its overall review distribution.
Especially, with the feature sets enriched with our
advertising speak features and syntactic complex-
ity features, the performance of the classifier even
further improves using additional mixed-domain
training data, by 10-14% across the latter three cat-
egories (Health, Electronics and Movies).
Note that for the smallest two domains, Elec-
tronics and Movies have deceptive reviews of 228
and 292, so the newly added deceptive reviews
(1,232) are several times of their original decep-
tive reviews. In order to understand how the per-
formance of the classifier was influenced when
increasingly adding times more training reviews
from assorted domains, we drew a learning curve
(shown in Figure 2) for each classifier that was ini-
tially trained with deceptive reviews from one of
Electronics and Movies. We can see that the per-
formance is consistently growing with times more
deceptive reviews added in training. We expect to
see further improvements if more data were pro-
vided.
These improvements confirm that with gener-
alized features, deception detection performance
can be remarkably improved using more data,
even with data from dramatically different do-
mains. It further emphasizes the value of the
new deceptive data collection method that relies
on social network analysis to generate amounts of
ground truth deceptive reviews across diverse do-
mains.
7 Effects of Reviewers and Personalized
Deceptive Writing Styles
Intuitively, reviewers of distinct personalities write
differently, which implies that reviewers should be
considered in deriving general rules for online de-
ception detection. Our dataset includes deceptive
reviews that were written by a diverse set of re-
viewers and many reviewers contributed dozens of
deceptive reviews, which enables us to study the
effects of reviewers in deception detection. In the
following, we present our initial findings.
Reviewer 1 Reviewer 2 Reviewer 3 Reviewer 4
113 112 78 80
Table 7: Number of Reviews for Each Person
Reviewer2 Reviewer4
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
F 
Sc
or
e
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Reviewer3
Figure 3: Reviewer level evaluation
We identified four deceptive reviewers that fall
into two groups based on their writing styles (Ta-
ble 7 shows the number of deceptive reviews
for each reviewer). Specifically, we observed
that reviews by the first group of reviewers use
shorter sentences and advertising words more fre-
quently in making comparisons. In contrast, re-
views by the second group of reviewers tend to
use longer and generally more complex sentences,
more numbers and more words related to per-
sonal feelings. Figure 3 shows the result when
we train the classifier using reviews from one re-
viewer taken from each category, say reviewer R1
and R3, and apply the classifier to deceptive re-
views written by the other two reviewers, R2 and
R4, also one from each category. The detection
performance can achieve F-scores as high as 70-
80% when it is trained and tested on the same type
of reviewers. In contrast, detection F-scores can
be as low as 30% when it is trained on one type
and tested on another type. Deceptive examples
from each reviewer is also listed in Table 8.
Reviewer 1: LOVE TO BAKE. I love these type of recipes
especially for cupcakes and cakes! I have tried almost them
all so far. It’s the best book for finding that perfect flavor for
that perfect event your planning. Highly recommended!
Reviewer 2: A cute kids book! I was honestly impressed
with this childrens book. I read it to my son and it kept his
interest, which is no easy task! He liked the front cover
picture. This was a hit with my son. Great book!
Reviewer 3: Very Valuable Information. The reason
why I bought this book is because I really needed a boost
in self confidence, my main luck of confidence was in
social situation where I tended to shy away and keep quite,
I must say that after reading this book my confidence level
went up and I feel much more comfortable when I am out
with friends, I now talk more, engage more in the
conversations and feel much better when out with friends.
Reviewer 4: Diet is awesome. Well..you know life is hard
when you’re fat, but if you get this you may succeed in
your diet and you will lose some pounds. My grandmother
was fat i bought this book for her and she is pretty well
now if you want to lose your weight you may seriously
want to try this book. I recommend it to anyone congrats
to the maker and good luck selling more copies.
Table 8: One Example Deceptive Review per Re-
viewer
8 Conclusion
We applied a new method for real world deceptive
review collection leveraging social network analy-
sis. The newly collected dataset is rich in products
and reviews and has two orders of magnitude more
deceptive reviews than previously used artificial
datasets. We demonstrate that such a large dataset
facilitates the development of identifying general-
ized features for deception detection. We further
show that with generalized features, additional de-
ceptive review data from assorted domains can be
used to improve both recall and precision of online
deception detection.
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